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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SETH H. YOUNG,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

RICHARD SAUNDERS,
)
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
11868

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff-respondent to obtain possession of a boat owned by him which was wrongfully taken and retained by the defendant-appellant.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court found 'the plaintiff-respondent
was the owner of the boat and entitled to immediate
possession thereof.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court upholding
the decision of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as outlined by the Appellant
on pages 2 and 3 of his brief are misleading and in many
places not supported by the evidence. The statement of
facts as found by the trial judge pages 68, 69 and 70 of
the tran.script are amply supported by the evidence and
are essentially as follows :
The Defendant-Appellant did undertake to borrow the sum of $1500.00 from First Security Bank,
using the boat as security, (Tr. pp. 31 and 39.) The
title of the boat was taken strictly as a security device
(Tr. p. 39.) The Bill of Sale specifically sets out consideration in the sum of $1500.00 not $2000.00 (R. 17.)
Sam Arge and the motor club organizations were in
difficult financial straits and were unable to borrow the
money needed in their own names.
No financing statement was filed by Mr. Saunders
showing the boat as security on an obligation to Mr.
Saunders on any of the motor club organizations, Mr.
Sam Arge or his son Kenneth (R. 17.) The First Security Bank did file a financing statement with the Secretary of State showing Richard Saunders as debtor
with a boat pledged as security (R. 17.) Sam Arge was
in fact the owner of the boat and cau.sed the same to be
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conveyed to the Plaintiff-Respondent through the then
registered owner, Kenneth Arge, on his behalf, (Tr.
pp. 8, 9, 10, 22, 26, 39, 50, 62 and 63.)
The boat was not a "gift" to Mr. Young but was
rather part of the consideration in resolving a complicated loan and security arrangement between them (Tr.
pp. 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16.)
Mr. Young tried to protect himself against any
difficulty by establishing that there were no problems in
connection with the title of the boat by checking with
the Secretary of State (Tr. p. 7), by specifically asking
Mr. Sam Arge and Mr. Kenneth Arge if there were any
liens against the boat (Tr. p. 21), and when Mr. Saunders advised Mr. Young that a local marine repair shop
may possibly be claiming a lien agains't the boat, Mr.
Young specifically inquired of the defendant's own attorney who assured him there was no problem and that
the repair bills did not constitute a lien against the boat
(Tr. pp. 11 and 12.)
Mr. Young was not aware that Mr. Saunders had,
claimed or might claim any interest as to title, ownership
or security in the boat either prior to his taking title
to the boat or, subsequent thereto, prior to his conclusion of the transactions with 1\-Ir. Arge and the motor
clubs, nor thereafter until such time as the boat was removed from his property the following spring (Tr. pp.
7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 39, 41 and 45.)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
ITS RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS
THE OWNER OF THE BOAT AND ENTITLED TO IMMEDIATE POSSESSION THEREOF.
Section 70A-9-301 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as
amended commonly referred to as the 'Uniform Commercial Code', specifically provides as follows:
70A-9-301. Persons who take priority over unperfected security interests - "Lien creditor."
- (I) Except as otherwise provided in subsection ( 2), an unperf ected security interest is subordinate to the rights of
(a) persons entitled to priority under section
70A-9-312;
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor
without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected;
(c) In the case of goods, instruments, documents, and chattel paper, a person who
is not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in ordinary course of business to the
that
he gives value and receives delivery of the
collateral without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected;
In this particular case Mr. Saunders did not perfect his security interest in the boat. The fact that the
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bank filed a financing statement
Mr. Saunders
as having borrowed money on the boat is irrelevant to
this action since the bank is not a party to the action and
is making no claim to any interest in the boat having
been paid in full on its note (Tr. p. 37.)
If the bank were a party, the financing statement
filed by it against the name of Richard Saunders would
place no one on notice upon a reveiw of the record unless that person knew in fact that Richard Saunders had
obtained a security interest from Sam Arge or some
other person or organization relating to him. If the
Bank were making a claim
the boat, justice
would require that the Uniform Commercial Code be
interpreted so as to protect an innocent buyer without
knowledge against such hidden transactions. To hold
otherwise would open the door to fraud and subterfuge
through which any person desiring to borrow money
could do so through a third party while retaining possession in himself and then proceed to deceive any subsequent party who would be unable to uncover the hidden
transaction and so be stripped of the protection intended for him by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
The boat in the present case remained in the possession of Sam Arge and his family and the title of the
boat given to Mr. Saunders was a security arrangement
designed to veil him with a phantom title so as to induce
the bank to make the loan to Mr. Saunders and nothing
more.
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The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
findings of the Trial Court will not be overturned or rever.sed unless clearly contrary to the evidence and that
the evidence on review must be viewed by the court in a
light most favorable to the holding of the Trial Court.
McCullum vs. Clothier, 241 P2d 468, 121 U. 311
(1952); Buckley vs. Cox, 247 P2d 277, 122 U. 151
(1952).
In the present case the court's findings, as detailed
on pages 68, 69 and 70 of the transcript, are supported
by the evidence presented at trial.
Every payment made on the financing of the boat
with Continental Bank was paid by the corporation and
charged directly against the draw of Mr. Sam Arge.
This is testified to by plaintiff's witness Joseph Anderson on page 26 of the transcript and also by the defendant's witness, Mr. Harry Stout (Tr. p. 50.)
Mr. Arge did not differentiate between his property and the property of the various corporate entities
through which he dealt (Tr. pp. 29, 62 and 63.)
If a Bill of Sale was given to one of the motor
clubs, Mr. Stout testified on page 67 of the transcript
that this was a transaction similar to that in which the
title was transferred to Mr. Saunders to obtain a loan
and was a security device only. Further the boat was
always registered in the name of either Sam Arge or
subsequently his son, Kenneth Arge, (Tr. pp. 8 and 9),
and the taxes in 1967 while the boat was regis'tered in
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the name of Kenneth Arge were paid by Kenneth Arge
(Tr. p. 10.)
There is ample evidence to support the court's finding that the boat was tran/)ferred to Mr. Young as part
of the consideration for satisfaction of an obligation due
and owing to Mr. Young. In concluding the complicated security transaction Mr. Young gave up among
other things the "Marion Davis bracelet" which he had
held as security along with other items and which was
itself worth more than all of the obligations owed to
him by Mr. Arge and the corporate organizations (Tr.
p. 7.)
The isolated statement, taken out of context by appellant at page 3 of his brief, is obviously just that, a
statement out of context, and does not alter the clear
import of the express testimony as set forth in the transcript on pages 6, 7, 8, 15 and 16 and the court's finding that the boat was part of the consideration in the
involved transaction should not be disturbed.
Mr. Young attempted to take advantage of the
protection afforded a potential purchaser by the Uniform Commercial Code and was advi_sed by the Secretary of State that there was no financing /)tatement
filed on the boat. He specifically asked Mr. Arge and
his son if there were any liens against the boat and was
advised there were not (Tr. p. 21.)
He had a particular conversation with Mr. Saunders relative to the boat at which time Mr. Saunders
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knew that he, Mr. Saunders, had a Bill of Sale to the
boat which fact he did not divulge to Mr. Young (Tr.
pp. 41 and 45.)
The corporation owed Mr. Saunders on an outstanding obligation and Mr. Saunders was aware of the
pressures which Mr. Young could place upon the corporation which was already in difficult financial circumstances. Thus he was in a position where it was
advantageous to himself, as well as the corporation, in
which he had other interests and of which he was either
at the time or shortly thereafter president, to clear the
corporation of its obligation to Mr. Young, an accomplishment which would be hampered if he divulged to
Mr. Young the fact that he claimed a security interest
in the boat which he knew Mr. Young was accepting
as part of the consideration in the transaction.
The evidence further supports the court's finding
that Mr. Young did not in fact become aware of and
did not know that Mr. Saunders had a security interest
in the boat. The only point of warning made by Mr.
Saunders was that certain parties who had made repairs
on the boat may be searching for it under claim of lien.
Mr. Young immediately stated he did not want to take
on more problems and that he did not want the boat if it
meant problems and was at the time specifically advised by the appellant's own attorney who entered the
conversation at that point that there was no problem
with regard to the bills as they did not constitute a lien
against the boat (Tr. pp. 11 and 12.)
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We are left in a position where Mr. Saunders who
knew he had obligated himself to First Security Bank
with the boat as security concealed this fact from Mr.
Young and knowing Mr. Young was giving up his
rights as against Sam Arge and the corporate structures in concluding the transactions in which he knew
the boat was part of the consideration and having specifically failed to record his security interest permitted
Mr. Young to 'take the boat without placing him on
notice. In fact thereafter Mr. Saunders did not contact
Mr. Young and advise him of a security interest in the
boat but rather had the boat removed from Mr. Young's
possession and then with full knowledge of the above
facts Mr. Saunder!) no'tified everyone except Mr. Young
that he had picked up the boat and did not notify him
until a later date after Mr. Young had reported the
boat as missing (Tr. p 47.) This was an obvious attempt to evade the one party who he clearly understood
'to be the owner of the boat.
The court found on page 70 that Mr. Saunders
knowing that the boat was actually in the possession of Mr. Young nevertheless removed it from
Mr. Young's possession where it had been stored
and transferred it to his own possession trusting
in the general complication of the situation to
protect his equity.
This finding is well supported by the evidence.
The fact that Sam Arge completed the transfer of
the boat by directing his son the then registered owner
9

to make out the Bill of Sale is not important since he
obviously had the right to deal with the boat as he saw
fit. His son, Kenneth, recognized this right and upon
instruction from his father, executed the Bill of Sale.
Mr. Sam Arge has never contested the validity of the
Bill of Sale nor raised any questions relating thereto.
The registration of the boat in the boy's name was either
an additional subterfuge to protect his father's assets,
or there existed between father and son an arrangement,
agreement or obligation by which the father could direct disposition of the boat for his own interest. The
exact details of such arrangements between father and
son are immaterial. The fact of the matter is that Sam
Arge told Mr. Young he could deliver the boat as part
of the consideration and this he did.

CONCLUSION
The findings of the Trial Court are amply supported by the evidence and the ruling of the Trial Court
should be sustained. The Plaintiff is the owner of the
boat and is entitled to immediate possession thereof. The
Defendant who has been permitted to retain possession
of the boat throughout this proceeding should be ordered to return it to the Plaintiff forthwith.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
E. Earl Greenwood, Jr.,
Jay A. Meservy.
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